Where do preferences for fairness come from? We use a unique field setting to test for a spillover of sharing norms from the workplace to a laboratory experiment. Fishermen working in teams receive random income shocks (catching fish) that they must regularly divide among themselves. We demonstrate a clear correlation between sharing norms in the field and sharing norms in the lab. Furthermore, the spillover effect is stronger for fishermen who have been exposed to a sharing norm for longer, suggesting that our findings are not driven by selection effects. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that work environments shape social preferences.
probable than uni-directional causality.
23
Although we have recently learnt a lot about factors that influence preferences for fairness, there are still 24 large differences in preferences within genetically and culturally similar populations. Our research question 25 in this paper is to test whether work environments influence individual preferences. We show that fishermen 26 who are exposed to 50/50 sharing rules on a daily basis are significantly more likely to reject unequal splits 27 in an ultimatum game than those working under 60/40 sharing norms. To account for potential selection 28 bias, we demonstrate that this result is driven by experienced fishermen who have been exposed to the 29 sharing norms for longer than their counterparts. Thus, we offer evidence in support of a third mechanism 
Background and Experimental Methodology

37
Our population of interest is a small-scale fishing community on the eastern shores of Lake Victoria in 38 Kenya. A single unpaved road connects the town of a few thousand people to the nearest major city. The 39 dominant industry in this town is fishing, with both subsistence and commercial fishing taking place. Like 40 other Kenyan fishing communities on Lake Victoria, the residents are predominantly Luo in ethnicity and 41 Christian in religion. These fishermen are an ideal group for studying the effect of work environments on 42 behavioral preferences, particularly using the ultimatum game. The small-scale fishermen receive random and were assigned a random ID number. To measure fairness, we employed the strategy method version 65 of the ultimatum game. Fishermen were taken individually into a private room with a trained enumerator.
66
Subjects were assigned as proposers or responders if their ID number was odd or even, respectively, with each 67 subject participating in a single role. Both proposers and responders were introduced to the game, provided 68 examples, and had to correctly answer comprehension questions before participating. Finally, proposers 69 and responders were given blank index cards to write their respective offers and minimum acceptable offers 70 (MAO), and then told to fold and place the cards into a sealed container while the enumerator waited outside.
71
The stakes in this game were for real money, and the amount to be split was 100 Kenyan Shillings (close 72 to one day's wages). To maintain full anonymity, participants were randomly paired among all participants 73 upon conclusion of the experimental sessions. Payments were distributed in the two days following the 74 experimental sessions and every single fishermen showed up to collect payment. offer fair splits (the mode offer is 50), while responders reject unfair offers (see Table 1 for details). To study 79 the effect of institutions on fairness norms, we use demographic data collected at registration which asks 80 for the type of gear used by fishermen. As mentioned earlier, day and night fishermen use gear specific to 81 their fishing purpose. We can then classify fishermen who report the use of seine nets as night fishermen 82 and those who report gill nets or long-lines as day fishermen. We avoided asking fishermen directly if they 83 are night or day fishermen to reduce potential priming of existing sharing norms.
84
Splitting our sample by day and night fishermen reveals interesting results. As shown in Table 2 
89
To target the causal direction of this relationship, we split the sample by whether the individual is a (Table 6 ). These results together lend evidence to the notion that fairness behavior 103 arises causally through exposure to an individual's work environment. We see that fishermen from a small 104 homogenous community exhibit differences in perceived fairness due to differences in workplace sharing 105 norms, which are linked to the underlying ecology of the species they target.
106
What drives these differences in MAOs between night and day fishermen? One potential explanation is 
127
We are not the first to demonstrate feedbacks between work institutions and economic behavior. Carpen- 
